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REAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE AT U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS 
M ari eta Ve lih. m a. Be lm o nt U ni ve rs it y 
K ev in Roge rs, M iss i ss ippi Stale U ni vers it y 
Deposit in.wrance legislatio11 currently beill f.: co11sidered by th e U.S. Co11gress proposes to increase lite nominal/eve/ of 
insurance coverage for th e jint time since th e passage of/)/ DMCA in 1980. S ince that time, th e jixed nomina/amount 
of CO I'era~:e has resulted in a11 erosio11 of th e real tliiiOUIIt of covera~:e due to co11 tillu ed i11jlatio11. This paper exami11e.1· 
th e re/atirm.1·hip betwee11 real co verage 1/1/(/ ba11k risk at i11dividual banks over the last I 0 years. Th e ji11dings suggest 
that th e cha11ge i11 real coverage over time has 110t been a.Hociated with 11 change in risk at commercial bank~·. This 
result implies that legi~·fation propo.1·ing to i11 crease nominal and real coverage will not res·uft in increased moral hazard 
behavior at banks. 
INTRODUCTION 
Depos it insurance leg islati on curTentl y bt.: ing considered by 
th e U .S. Congres~ rroposes to increase th t.: nominal leve l of 
insurance cove ra ge for the first time since th e r assagc or 
DIDM CA in 1980 . Since that tim e, th e fi xed nom inal amount 
or cove rage ha~ r t.: sultcd in an ero~ i o n or th e r·t.:a l amount o r 
cove rage due 10 con tinu ed inlbtion. rh e r1 e11' leg islati on under 
co nsiuerat ion would rai se nominal coverage and th en index that 
J rn ourll so th at the r·ea l leve l o r cove rage 11 ill n: rn ai n s1:1ble in 
the fu ture. J'r·oponentS Of th e inc rease Ill 11 0 111 ina! COl erage 
argue th ;rl the stead) reducl ron in rea l COICI'age has had a 
negatrve rmracl 0 11 b<rr1J..s that rely rmm.: hc,11 rl ) o r1 i r1 -; ur·cd 
depos its as a sour·ce o r fu nds. Since th ese b<lll k '> arc tyrr call _v 
smaller instituti on . th ey an; at an even grea ter d isadvantage 
due to any impli c it sr1bsidy fo r banks th at arc too big to fail. 
Orponents or thi s leg islat ion poi nt 10 th e moral haLard 
assoc iated w ith deposit insurance . They argue th at increas in g 
nominal cove rage wo ul d resu l t in more ri sk -1:1kin g behav ior· as 
ev idenced in th e S& L cri sis o f th e laic 1980s-ea rl y 1990s. 
T his pape r loo J.. s at th e second o f th ese argument s by 
e\a rni ning th e relati onship be tween bank ri sJ.. and rea l deposit 
tnsurance cove rnge . The testab le hypoth es is is that the amount 
or rea l deposit insura nce cove r::~ ge is pos iti vt.: ly related to hanJ.. 
ri sk , support in g th e rnoral hnLa r·d argurm :nt. U nder th e 
alternati ve , rea l cove rage is not related to banJ.. ri sk, being 
consistent 11 ith the argument th <:ll the bent.: fit s to increasing 
cove rage mny outwe igh an) moralli az::~ rd issues. Using a panel 
o r U .S. co mmerc ial banh. s, a model reli1ti ng banJ.. ri sk 10 rt.: al 
cove rage and Llt hcr re l ev~1111 financ ial va riab les is estimat cd 
Si r1 ce rea l covc r;1ge lias dec l ined ovn time, hank ri sJ.. should 
h c~ve also dccl in t.: d . ;rll ehe held eonstan l , accord ing to th e 
moral h a~:il rd argument. 
Re~ca rch on Depos it Insurance 
There i<. a l;rr-gc am Olllll o r lit cr·alure, hoih tll eo r·eti cal arid 
cr nptri ca l, on depo <> it insur·ance Some rccc: nt C\ ~lrllp l c~ arc 
C ull . Se nbet , and Sorge (:~ 00 5 ) Oil th e impact or depOS it 
i rl <; ur:lll ce on firwn c ia l de ve lo pment and stabi lit y; o and W ei 
(200..J) on depos it insurance and fo rbearan ce; Laeven (2004) on 
til e po l iti cal eCO ilOill Y aspects o f deposit insurance ; and 
J)e mirguc-K unt and Kane (2002) on an intern ati onal 
co mJXlrison o f depos it insurance reg imes. 
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The most frequent topic throughout depos it insurance 
research relates to th e issue o f pr ic ing deposit insurance 
premi a. i\charaya and D rey fu s ( 1989) deri ve a deposit 
insurance premium related to th e deposit to asse t rati o and bank 
in vestm ent. T hey find th at deposit insurance premia is a non-
decreasing fun cti on o f th e deposit to asset rat io and a 
monotoni call y increas ing fun cti on o f th e ri sk of bank 
in ve stm ent. F l:11111 ery ( 199 1) looks at th e case w here th e insurer 
measures bank ri sk wi th erro r, ti n lin g th at a combi nati on o f 
ri sk-b:1<> ed prcr .ra and ri sk -related car it a! standards is optimal. 
M :i!ul e'> 11 1d V rv..:s (2000) look at the we l fare effec ts of 
di iTCI'C il! d t.: jlO'> II insur<:lll ee reg imes, inc ludin g both nat- rate and 
ri sk -based pr<.: lll lir. Duffie et al. (2003) apply m eth ods fo r fi xed-
inco me securiti es to co 111put e fair-market deposit insurance 
premia. These arti les prov ide a sampling o f the lit eratu re but 
arc not ex hausti ve o f th e resea rch on ri sk o r mark et based 
premia. 
The one area large ly neg lec ted in thi s bod y of wo rk is th e 
exp l ic it stud y of the amount of co verage, either rea l o r nominal, 
prov ided by depo>it in surance. So me recent research has 
al! cmpted to loo J.. at th e amount of co ve rage, focusing on cross-
coun try diffe rences. Demirguc- Kunt and Detrag iache (2002) 
find ev idence that hi gher coverage leve ls increase the 
l ih. el ihood o f b:lllJ..i ng cri st.:s. Dcmirguc- Kunt and Hu iz inga 
(2004) find th at hi gher lew is o r cove rage red uce interest rates 
while wea kening marJ.. ct disc ip l ine. Lac ve n ( 2004) uses a 
po liti ca l economy approach to exp lain d i fferences in coverage 
ac ross countri es. !l is Jinc..li ngs suggest that pri va te interests 
rath er thun po liti ca l instituti ons innuencc th e am ount o f deposit 
insur·il nce cove ra ge. 
The fo llow in g rs an att empt to ex pa nd current researc h on 
th e amount o r deposit in urance cove rage. By focusing on U .S. 
conlnl er-c ial ha r1b and e' p lo i1 ing th e fac t that rea l deposit 
insur·anc li a-; ~ t c adi l _v !a ll en throughout th e samp le per iod , thi s 
paper a l! e rn p t ~ to exa mine th e cllcct o f coverage on th e amount 
or r · i ~ k a1 ind iv id ual bank s. B uild ing on empiri ca l m ode ls o f 
banJ.. ri sJ.. u-,cd by ll assan ( 1993 ). ll assan ancl Sac k ley ( 1994 ), 
Hassan. K arels, ::~ nd Pett.: rson ( 1994 ), and Kho r:~ ss a n i (2000). 
the 31ll0Uill o r rea l coverage is ildded as a determinant o r bank 
ri sk . The stud y by Hassan and Sack Icy ( 1994) prov ides 
empiri ca l ev idence o f ca pita l market reacti ons to th e grow th 
and ri sk incss of bank o tT-ba lance sheet loa n commitment 
ac ti v iti es. Using data for th e 100 largest U .S. banks and BH Cs 
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from 1984 through 1988. thi s paper reports strong ev idence that 
loan commitments reduce bank risk . Hassan, Karels, and 
Peterson ( 1994) examine th e market disc ipline of OBS 
activities on the default ri sk p1·emia o f bank subord inated debt. 
They find that OBS acti v ities reduce bank ri sk . Therefore, they 
conclude that it may be inappropriate to inco rporate some OBS 
activities in th e ca lcul ati on o f ri sk-ba ed capital requ irements. 
Khorossani (2000) using a cross-sec ti onal data set on U . 
commercial banks empirical ly exa mines th e argument th at 
during the mid 1980s to ea rl y 1990s depos itor we re insensitive 
to bank ri sk. Lilli e support is fo und for this argument. Has an 
( 1993) has examined mark et disc ipline o f commercia l letters of 
credit , loan sa les, standby leu ers o f cred it , interest rate swaps 
and other OBS banking acti iti es b using implied asset ri sk. 
His empirical results suggest th e ex istence o f market disc ipline 
of these OBS acti v ities. 
Hypothesis and Model Specifi ca tion 
This paper investi gates th e relati onshi p between rea l 
deposit insurance coverage and bank ri sk. I f deposit insurance 
results in moral hazard behavio r, th en bank ri sk should be 
related to the leve l o f cove rage. T o exa mine thi s relati onship. 
the foll owing moral hazard hy poth e is is tested: 
Bank risk is positi vely related to th e leve l o f rea l deposit 
insurance coverage. 
U nder the null hypoth es is. th e amount o f rea l deposit 
insurance cove rage is assoc iated w ith bank ri sk. Thi s result 
would impl y that in creas ing th e amount o f rea l cove rage. as is 
being considered in current legislat ion, would result in more 
ri sk in th e banking y te1n. nder th e alt ern ati l e hypothes is. 
bank ri sk would be umelated to real c01 erage, suggesting th at 
raising th e amount o f coverage 11 0uld not be assoc ia ted w ith 
additional ri sJ.. . To test th is moral ha7a rd h) pothes is, an 
empirica l mode l is co nstructed that rel:lles bani-. ri sk to a set of 
explanatory vari ables, inc lu di no real coverage, and oth er 
contro l vari ab les that mi ght in!luence bank ri k . T he model is 
estimated for indi v idual banks using cross-secti on and annual 
time-seri es data from 1995-2004 . T he data wa obtained from 
the FDI C's Report s of Inco me and Condition prov ided by 
Financial Inform ati on System . 
For the dependent va ri ab le in th e rcgre sion model a 
measure o f ri sk is needed. In th i contex t, wh at is importan t is 
the ri sk exposure of th e depos it in urance system. Si nce thi s 
type of ri sk ha diffe rent d imensions. three sepn ratc mode ls are 
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estimated, each u ing a different measure o f ri sk to the deposit 
insurance system as a dependent va ri able. O ne dependent 
vari ab le is th e rati o of bank equity to total assets (EQU ITY) . 
The amount o f equity measures the size o f the cushion a bank 
has to absorb losses on th e asset side o f the balance sheet . If 
deposit insurance results in moral hazard behav ior, th en banks 
will ho ld a sma ll er cushion aga inst potential losses, due to th e 
safety net prov ided by th e insurance . T he capital rati o is 
regul ated by federal as well as intern ati onal standard s so banks 
nl <t )' not be comp letely free to alter thi s ra ti o . Du rin g the time 
peri od under examinati on, real cove rage fe ll. so if th e 
relat ion hip re!lectin g moral hazard is present , the rati o should 
have ri sen. T his type of change would not be prohi b ited by 
capital standards since they set minimums onl y. 
Since a larger amoun t o f equit y represents a smaller amount 
o f r isk , small values of th e dependent va ri ab le impl y more ri sk . 
l-Ienee, an independent variabl e that is positi vely related to 
bank ri sk would have a negati ve coeffi c ient. T he dependent 
vari able o f the second model i the rat io o f in sured deposits to 
total li abiliti es ( INSURED). T his va ri ab le measures the 
proport ion o f bank liabilities th at th e depos it insurance system 
could be liab le fo r i f a bank became inso lvent. The dependen t 
va ri able o f the third model measures th e rati o o f brokered 
deposits to total li abiliti es (B RO K ERED). Brokered depos its 
typ ica ll y prov ide a way for large depos itors to ex p loit th e 
nominal cove rage l imit , so similar to INSU RED , thi va ri ab le 
measures potenti al ex posure to los cs faced by the deposit 
insurance sys tem. For both INSURED and BR O K ERED, a 
largc1· amount wou ld represent more ri sk ex posure so an 
independent va ri ab le w ith a positi ve relati onshi p wi th ri sk 
would have a posi ti ve coeffi c ient. 
I 01' th e e:-.pla natory va 1·iab les th e pn1nar :- focus wil l be 
pl aced on RCO , th e rea l leve l o f cJ e ro ~ it insu1·ance coverage 
measured in 200-1 do llars. T his var inb le w ill va ry over tim e. bu t 
be co n ~ Wtll aero s banks at a po int in time. Acco rdi ng to the 
moral hazard h) pot hes is. RCO V should be pos it ive ly related to 
bank ri sJ.. . Fo1· the mode l w ith EQU ITY as a dependent 
va ri able , a signifi cant negati ve coe ffi c ient wo uld support 
th e . .lea th at depos it insurance is assoc ia ted w ith morn! 
haza rd behav ior. For the other two dependent var iab les, a 
sig1tili ca nt pos it ive coeffi c ient wo ul d support th e moral hazard 
hypoth c is. 
In additi on to RCOV, oth er ex p lanator y va ri ab les arc 
inc luded to contro l for oth er factors that ma) be related to bank 
ri sk. The fu ll model w ith c:-. pected signs is g iven by the 
fo llow in g: 
i ; 
R = /( RCO I ., LLA TL. L1\ 'SJZE. DERCON, SECJN I'AR, N l l lR . L.·l.i R, CILLR . NPAT·l. ROI:' ). ( 1) 
R 
RCOV 
LL/\TI. 
LNSIZE 
IX RCON 
SEC I NV t\ 1 ~ 
Nl I ~ 
L/\ 1\ R 
CILLR 
P/\T/\ 
IWE 
bank risl-- . 
le ve l Of real covcr;lg_C (lhOUSilnds or ~ ()()4 doll ars). 
rati O or lniln-loss ;tii OIIancc \0 IOI;il loans: 
logarithm <lr to til l h. Ill I-- "''c is: 
lkl'l I ill I\ CS f10>il iOn imi iCil lllr: 
rilllll ll f. IOiil f SCC UI'II ) llliL'SI IllCil l or c :~ c h IJ ;111k IOIUI;il i i'SCh. 
rilllllll l llllaf llCI lll CO IIlc Ol each hank Ill ib lOla I <l '"CIS. 
ra11n urtut;l lllllllld '"'''" nfc:tch lli 111 k to tiS tnt :il ;hsch. 
ra11 n nl ll>l. tl COIIltnet CI,tl ,md 111dustriill lua1h nl c.tch h.lllk lll lll ial loans. 
ralln of ll llllpcri(H'In ll lg iiSSCIS 10 lOla I ii 'SCIS . 
return on ClJU II )'. 
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LL/\ TL and LN SIZ E are pro.x ies for creel it ri sk and bank 
size. respecti ve ly ( Hassan & Sack ley, 1994 ). The vari ab le 
LLAT L accounts for credit ri sk and represents the probability 
o f fu ture defaults. 1-1 igher r. red it ri sk ren ects a higher degree o f 
ex pected loss in th e loan ponto l io; th erefore, LLATL is 
positi ve ly related to bank ri sk . A la1·ger bank has more opti ons 
to d ive rsify it s asset ponfo li o and I wer it s earnin g var iab i li ty . 
Moreo ver, investo1·s believe th ai IMge ba nks are protected from 
fa ilure by a greater degree o f regulatory support. Therefo re the 
bank ri sk and L NS IZE are ex pected to be nega ti vely related. 
A s a measure o f o fT-balance sheet acti v ities, D ERCON has 
been constructed from acti v iti es li sted on schedu le RC-L o f the 
FD IC's report o f cond iti on . D ERCON is defin ed as the sum of 
four categori es o f contracts: interest rate contracts, foreign 
exchange contracts, equity deri vati ve contracts, and commodit y 
and other contracts. Each category o f contracts is ca lculated as 
the sum o f the gross amount o f futures cont racts, forward 
contracts, and sw aps. Gross contracts are used to construct 
D ERCON since the focus o f th is va r iab le is the overall vo lume 
o f th ese acti v it ies instead o f the bank 's net posit ion. Hass an, 
Ka1·els. and Peterson ( 1994) in their sllldy construct fi ve o ff-
balance sheet va ri ables from 19 items included in th e RC-L 
schedu le. T hey fin d that o tT-ba lance shee t act iv it ies tend to 
reduce bank ri sk by prov idi ng d i ve rsifi cat ion to the ba nk. 
From thi s, D ERCON and bank ri sk arc ex pected to be 
nega ti ve ly related. 
O th er ex planatory va ri ab les inc lude 111 easures o f th e 
composition and quali ty o f assets and bank pm fitab il it y as 
fo und in Kh orossani (2000) . T he r ;-~ t i o of total securit y 
in vestm ent to total assets is a mea s u1"<:~ o f asset qualit y. U . S. 
governm ent secu:·iti es provide bo th liqu id it y and income to a 
bank and are free o r default ri sk. theret"o re the SEC I V/\ R is 
ex pected to h ;-~ve a nega t i ve ef tCc t on bank r isk. T he rat io of net 
inco me to total assets (N I A R) is a measure o f bank pro fitabili ty 
reln ti ve to assets. Thi s pro fi tab il it y mensure also accounts to r 
the composit ion o f bank act iv it ies betwee n tradi t ional and 
nontrad iti onal area . It is ex pec ted to be nega t i ve ly related to 
r isk since higher pro fi ts should strengthen a bank 's cond iti on, 
all else constant. T he rati o o f l iquid assets to total assets 
(LA/\ R) is a measure o f a bank 's ab il i ty to meet the increa se d 
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liquidity needs o f its depositors. L iquid assets provide safety 
and at the same time reduce pro fitabilit y of a bank . Liquid 
assets should also be nega ti ve ly related to bank ri sk since they 
renect a more stable mi x o f assets. T he rat io of total 
commercial and industri al loa ns to total loans (C ILLR) is 
included to contro l for th e co mposition o f a bank 's loan 
portfo li o. 
Acco rdin g to K horassani (2000), there is no clear 
relat ionshi p between C I LLR and bank ri sk . In her stud y 
modelin g bank ri sk as the li kel ihood o f failure, the coe ffic ient 
on thi s va ri ab le was pos iti ve in some instances and negat ive in 
others. T he rati o o f nonperform ing assets to total assets 
(N PA T A ) is included to contro l for the quality o f a bank ' s 
assets. It is expected to be positi ve ly related to bank ri sk since 
nonperformin g assets add to overall ri sk . Return on equity 
( ROE) is also included to measure bank profitability relative to 
stockh older ' s equity. ROE is expected to be pos iti vely related 
to bank r isk since it renects bank per form ance. T he model also 
includes ind iv idual bank and time effects, since the data used in 
the study combines cross-secti on and time seri es data. 
EM PIRI C AL R ES ULTS 
Da ta 
1\ panel o f 6. 7 54 banks over th e years 1995 -2004 was 
employed to perform th e econometri c analys is. A ll financial 
vmiabli.:s were co nstructed annuall y using inform ati on f rom th e 
Decembe 1· ca ll report in each year . Figures I . 2 , and 3 display a 
time >crie s plot o f nomi nal and rea l coverage along wit h each 
dependen t var iab le. Figure> I . 2. and 3 also show the steady 
dec l ine in rea l covc 1·age ove r 1he ten years o f the sample. Real 
cove rage expressed in 2004 lo ll ars has fallen from 
approx imately $ 1-1 0,000 in 1995 to $ 100,000 in 2004 . Figure I 
shows th at bani-. r isk ns mensurcd by the rat io o f equ ity to 
asse ts. fo llows a sli ght U -shaped patlern over rim e. Figure 2 
shows th at bank ri sk measur-ed by the rati o o f insured deposits 
to total li ab il iti es dec lines unti l 2000 , then it ri ses till the yea r 
o f 2003, and after thi s year it start s decli ning again. Figure 3 
shows th at bank ri sk measured by the rati o o f brokered deposits 
to tota l li ab ilities steadi ly increases from 1995 through 2004 . 
Figure I : Nomin al and Rea l Cove r age vs, R isk : Ra ti o o f Equit y to T otal A ssets 
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Regress ion Res ult s 
Figure 2 
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Nomina l and Real Cove rage vs. Risk: Percentage of In sured Deposits 
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Figure 3 
No minal vs. Rea l Risk: Percentage of Brokered Depos it s 
Figure A.4 
Nomina l and Rea l Coverage vs . Ri sk 
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Tab le I: Fixed Effec ts Res ult s (s tandard errors in pare nth eses) 
ln dqH'IIl l l' ll t Variahk ~ l)_~ p l' lldl' lll \';l r iah h:~ ( I) 1-QU ITY (2) INS l iRI' D (3) 131\0 KERED 
IICO I ' ll JX9 E+ IO -0 8221-+09 -0 2 ~ ~ 1~+ I 0 ( 171 L+ I I) (~ 0 11:+ 11 ) ( 23 1 E+ ll ) 
LL. I TL 
() 227*** 0 1(,()'** -0 13 1*'* 
( 0 11 ) ( 025 7) ( 0 1 ~8) 
LNSIZE -0 03 8*'* -0 0 19** ' 0 . 0~ 5* ** (.805 E-J) (. 1891:':-2) ( 109E-2) 
DERC'Ot\ ' 0 7J OE- 12 0524r: - ll *" OJ85 E-12 ( 53 9E- 12) ( 1261:': - 11 ) ( 729E- 12) 
SECINI 'AR o 4~ S E-o~ · ·· -0 688 [-0~ -0 629E -0~ *' ( 185[ -4 ) ( ~ J ~ E-1) (.25 [-4) 
t\'1.·111 0 272E-02*** OJJ6E-OJ 0.2JJ E-OJ ( 3 12E-J ) ( 732 E-J ) ( 422 E-J) 
!.A All 
0 909 E-02*** 0.4 321:':-02" -0 178 F-02*' 
( 785 [-J ) ( 1 8 ~ F-2 ) ( 106 F-2) 
CILLI? -0 0 1*** -0 0~ 6 *. * 0 () 16*** ( 24J F-2) ( 57 1 E-2) (329 E- 2) 
/1'1'.-ITA -0 129*** 0 755 [ -02 0030'* ( 997 1 .. ·2 ) ( 023) ( 0 135 ) 
!WE -0027*'* 0 ~ ~ 7 1 -02 -O n n :-02 ( 155 [ -2) ( 36~ 1 - -2) ( 2 10[- 2) 
MIJ R2 0 798 0 7.1~ () 65 1 
F-statistic snt :i-1 ~ 6 ~ ] 07 J ~n OJ 
Tab le I above presents th e cocl fi c ienl s o f the esti lll alccl 
regression models. T he equati ons were estim :11ecl using th e 
r:llio o f equit y to total assels (co lumn 1), the rati o o f insured 
cleposil s to t o t ::~ I l iab ilit ies (co lumn ::n, ancl 1he rati o o f brokerccl 
clcposils to total li abiliti es (co lumn 3) as measures of risk . 
G iven I he large sample size fo r each year o f cl at:J . the central 
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limit theorem sugges ts th e va ri ab les are norm all y distributed. 
li enee, bo th fi xe d and random effect models were estimated . 
' I he Hausman ( 1978) test for fi xed vs. random effects was 
conducted and led to the reject ion o f the random effects mode l 
in each case. For mode ls ( I ), (2), and (3) Chi -square va lues 
with p-va lucs in parentheses arc respecti ve ly 1440 .2(.0000) , 
179.04( .0000) , and 111 2 3(.0000) . 
Poten ti al multi co ll inea rit y between the two pro fitab il ity 
measures ( RO I: attd IAR) was addressed . T he estim ated 
co rrelati on coerli c ient between ROE and N I/\R is -0.0 1405, 
th erefore mult tco l l incil rit y docs not appear to be a prob lem. !\ 
Cu ll co rrelati on matri >. o f th e independent va ri ab les is presented 
in appendi x A A ~ a furth er chec k ror mu lti co llinea r it y, Cilc h 
model wa s 1·e - e~ t ttn i:l ted 0 111 itt ing th e insign i li ca nt dependent 
\<triabl es (e>. ccp t ror th e Vilr tabl c of interest, I~COV ). RCOV 
remained instgnili ca nt w hile th e oth er va t·iablcs were still 
signilicant w ith th e sante signs. lt1di v idua l lixed e!Tec ts were 
estimated for c<tch b<t nk and fo r th e lirsl nine yce~rs o f th e 
samp le. An overall intercept wa s not inc luded to avo id per fect 
co llinearity . oc f li cie nt cstitnntcs of the fi xed effec ts are not 
rcpo t1ed due to space limitat ions. 
Overall , th e regn.:ssion models see m to prov ide 3 good fit. 
T he F-stat isti cs were signili cant lor all three models. Adjusted 
1< 1 i 0 .798 for model ( 1), 0.738 lo r model (2) and 0.65 1 for 
mode l (3). M ost of the independent va ri ables ha ve significant 
cocr!i c ients wi th th e expected sign. Co nfidence i tt lcrva ls o f th e 
coefli c ients arc given in i:ippendi x 13 . 
T he pr imary focus o f thi s paper is th e relati onsh ip between 
th e amount o r rea l deposit insurance co verage and bank 1·isk. 
Accordin g to th e mora l haLard hypoth esis above, bank ri sk is 
positi ve ly related to th e level of rea l deposit insurance 
coverage. A s a result , th e coc rfi c icnt o f rea l cove rage (RCOV) 
is expected to be significan tl y nega ti ve in column ( I ) and 
signifi ca ntl y postti ve in co lumns (2 ) and (3) . /\ ~ ca n be seen i11 
table I , th e e~tim ~ tt ed coc rli c ients on I{COV :m: consistentl y 
i n ~ i g nifi ca nt. I ht s 1·csult docs not support th e moral ha; :trd 
h) pothesis. It impli c~ th ::l! th e .>tc<H.I) dL'Citnc 111 real depostt 
insurance covera ge 111 th e l : 1 ~ t ten yea rs has tlot :iiTected h:111 k 
ri '> k , as tn easut·ed by all tl11·ce depcnd L: tlt v;u·i:tblc s. l l ) 
C\ tension , current lcg islati nn 1xuposin g to increase th L: amo un t 
o r nominal co verage ~ 11 d then index it to inll atinn shoul d not 
add signill ca ntl ) to th e ri s k - t a ~in g behav ior or bank s. Thi s 
policy would re sult in an initial increase in rL:a l coverage 
fo ll owed by a conswnt amount o r rea l cove rage . A cco rding to 
th e above lindings thi s po li cy change wou ld not expose th e 
ban~ in g system and th e FD IC to increased ri sk brought about 
b) tn orZJ I ha/ard be hav ior . !'hi s result is robust to all three 
model lormu lat i o n ~ . 
l' o r the regress inn mode l using EQU lTV as the dependent 
vat·iablc th e eoe fli c icnt s or oth er exp l(l natory v;tri aiJics arc il ll 
~ t gnillca nt exce pt Urt L' , wi th most hilvi ng the ex pec ted sign. T he 
dL: r i vat ivc po~ ition indi cator ( I) I::RCON), th e o tT-ba lance shed 
\:lrlablc , is not ' tati ' t tca ll y signi li cant suggesting that for the 
time peri od L"ed in th e present stud y o fT-ba lance shee t 
ac ti vi ti es by comnt c: t·c i:tl ba nks did 11 0t have an impact on bank 
ri sk measured by th e rati o o f to tal equ it y to total assL: ts. T hese 
resul ts arc no t consistent wi th th ose o f ll assan ( 1903) , and 
ll a s~ a n , 1-: arc ls, Zt nd Peterson ( 1994) who have lo und ev idence 
Journal or 13usiness and Leadership : Research, Practi ce. and Tcachino 
2007. Vo l. 3. No. t . t 44- t s2 
th at o ff-ba lance sheet acti v iti es are negati vely assoc iated with 
bank ri sk , as measured by th e implied asset var iance derived 
from Gorton and Santomero 's ( 1990) subordinated debt option 
prici ng mode l and th e im p lied asset vari ance w ith the leverage 
rati o augmented by OBS debt. 
A s ex pected, the coe ffi c ient o f liquid assets to tota l assets 
rati o ( LA A R) is positi ve and stati stica ll y signifi cant at a 1% 
leve l. A higher rati o o f liquid assets to total assets is assoc iated 
wit h a higher rati o of tota l bank equi ty to totnl bank assets 
imp ly ing lower bank inso lvency r isk in thi s case. T his agrees 
w ith K horossan i ' s (2000) result th at a bank 's abilit y to meet 
deposit ors' increased li quidit y preferences has a negati ve effect 
n bank ri sk. Net income to total asse ts t·ati o (N IAR) has the 
expected positi ve sign and it turn s out to be stati sti ca ll y 
sig11i licant at I u o . !\ h ighcr rnt io or net income to total assets is 
assoc iated w ith a hi ghc t· ra ti o of total bank equity to total bank 
assets. Therefore, ba nks w ith hi gher prollts are less likely to 
become inso lvent. Thi s result also support s Khorossani 's 
(2000) finding that a measure of a bank 's pro fit abilit y is 
inverse ly related to bank ri sk. T he nonper forming assets to total 
assets rat io (NPATA), approx im atin g asset quali ty, is negati ve 
and signili cant at a 1% leve l. !\ higher rati o o f nonperforming 
assets to total assets is assoc iated wi th a lower rati o of total 
bank equ itv to total bank assets and hi gher inso lvency ri sk. 
ll o lding 1110n:: nonper fom1ing assets in it s portfo lio suggests 
that .t bank is more li kely to become inso lvent. Return on 
equit y ( ROE) , th e most co mm on measure for bank pro fitab ilit y 
related to stock ho lders' equi ty, has th e expected negati ve sign 
and is stati sti ca ll y significa nt at a 1% level. A higher return on 
eq uit y is assoc iilt ed w ith a lower rati o of total bank equity to 
total ba n~ a sets im p ly ing more ri sk. T he rati o of total securit y 
in ves tm ents to totJI asse ts (SEC INV /\R) is signifi cantl y 
pos it ive at a 5% leve l. A h igher rJti o of total secmity 
i11 vestm ent to total ilsse ts is associated w ith a hi gher rati o of 
tota l bank equit y to total ba nk assets. Securit ies are free from 
d el~1ult 1 · 1 s ~ , moreover, th ey prov tdc liq uid it y and income to a 
hZ~ttk , :tttd th erelo t·c a I<Hge :~m o unt or secur iti es in asset 
portro li us improves ba nk asset qualit y and decreases 
in so lvency ri s ~ . T his outco me supports th e empiri ca l fi nd ings 
by Kh oro<;snni (2000) . 
14o 
The ci'ICc t on ba nk ri sk of th e rati o of commercial and 
industri al loans to to tal loa ns (C ILLR) wa s indeterminate 
accordi ng to 1-:h orossani (2000) . T he result in tab le I for model 
( I ) shows th at th e effect or thi s rati o on bank ri sk is negative 
and significant at a 1% leve l. !\ higher rati o o f commercial and 
industri al loans to total loa ns is assoc iated w ith a lower rati o o f 
total bank equit y to tota l bank assets. C ILLR ren ects the 
compositi on o f a bank 's loan port fo l io . Banks with a high 
concentrat ion o r co lllm crc ial and industri al loa ns and 
consequent ly a les s d ive rsi ll ccl loan portlo lio ex hi bit more ri sk. 
Moreover, loans arc subject higher ri sk than securities. 
The ratio o r loan loss allowances to total loa ns ( LLATL), a 
proxy for cred it ri sk and th e probab i lit y or future defau lt , is 
signi ll cant and pos itive. T he anti c ipated sign for LLATL is 
negati ve suggestin g th at banks with hi gher cred it ri sk arc more 
l ikely to become inso l vent. T he pos iti ve coe ffi c ient implies th at 
a higher rati o o f loan loss all owa nce to total loans is assoc iated 
w ith a hi gher rat io of total ba nk equ it y to total bank assets. A 
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poss ible exp lanati on o f thi s result is th at banks with additional 
loan loss exposure decide to ho ld more equity as a way to 
protect themse l ves from loan losses. 
The proxy for bank size ( LN SIZE) doesn ' t retain the 
anticipated sign and it is signifi cantl y negati ve at a 1% 
significance level. Thi s res ult , similar to the result fo r LLATL 
coefficient, is not in agreement w ith Hassan and Sackl ey 
( 1994 ) . The reason behind thi s result may be th at for large 
banks it is eas ier to ho ld less equit y since th ey have a grea ter 
abi lit y to diversify their asset portfo lio. M oreover, th ey have 
better access to capital markets, increas ing th eir ab ility to 
borrow. Large banks also rece ive a greater degree of regulatory 
support and plus any imp lic it subsidy for banks too big to fa il. 
Due to all of th ese factors, large banks do not have to ho ld as 
much equit y . 
Each dependent va t·iab le used in models ( I ). (2) and (3) 
measures different aspects o f r isk. C:QU \TY meas ures 
inso lvency ri sk. INSURED measures t·isk ex posure o l· the 
insurance fu nd to poss ib le losses. '' hi le BROKERED meas ures 
abuse o f the system and conseq uentl y potenti al ex posure to 
losses faced by th e deposi t insurance system. For EQU ITY a 
larger amou nt represent s less ri sk e.xposure, for I SU RED and 
BROKERED a larger amount represent more ri sk ex posure. 
U nder the moral haza t·d hypoth es is RCO V is ex pected to be 
negati ve for the model using EQU ITY and posit ive for mode ls 
using INSURED and BRO K ERED. Howeve r, due to the fact 
that dependent var iab les measure differen t aspects of risk, th e 
signs o f other independen t va ri ab les inc luded in th e models to 
account tor other factors th at influence ri sk may not co rrespond 
across all three mode ls. Results may not be consistent for the 
same independent va ri ab le. 
For the model using INSU RED as th e dependen t var iab le 
th e results are presented in co lu mn (2) . Loa n- loss al lowa nce to 
total loans rat io (LLATL) is posit ive and stati sti ca ll y 
signifi cant at 1% . A higher degree o f ex pec ted losses in th e 
loan portfo lio is assoc iated with a higher rat io o f insured 
deposits to total I iabi I iti es. The pro port ion of bank I iab i I iti es 
th at the depos it insurance system could be l iab le for if a bank 
became inso lvent is highet· fot· banks th at expe ri ence grea ter 
credit ri sk. 
The logarithm of tota l bank assets ( L N SIZ E) is nega t ive 
and stati stica ll y signill ca nt at l 0 o. A \;n ge ba n\.- , as measut-ecl 
by assets, has a lower rati o of insured d c po~ II S to total l tabiliti es 
and is assoc iated w ith less ex posure or th e insurance fund to 
poss ib le losses. Th is impl ies th at larger banl-- s rely less on 
insured deposits. consistent w ith th e prev ious findin gs by 
Hassan and Sack ley ( 1994) that large banks have greater abilit y 
to borrow as we ll as to diversif. asset portfo li o, and large 
banks enj oy a grea ter degree of regul atory support . 
DERCON is pos iti ve and stat isti ca ll y signifi cant at 1% . 
After contro lling fo r bank size, banks wi th more o ff-balance 
sheet acti v ities also have t·e lati ve ly more insured deposit s. 
Banks, w ith more in vo lvement in o iT ba lance sheet acti v iti es 
rely more on insured deposits to fina nce th eir asset portfo lio. 
The liquid assets to total assets rati o (LAAR) is positi ve and 
stati sti ca ll y significant at 5%. A h igher rati o of liqu id assets to 
total assets is assoc iated w ith a larger amount o f insured 
deposits as a percentage of total I iab i I it ies . li enee, banks w ith a 
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better ab ilit y to meet increased liquidity preferences of 
depositors rely more heav il y on insured deposits vs . uninsured 
depos its, imp ly ing a greater ri sk for the insurance system . 
The commerc ial and industri al loans to total loans rati o 
(C ILLR) is negati ve and stati stical ly significant at 1%. A 
higher rati o of commercial and industri al loans to tota l loans is 
assoc iated with a smaller amount of insured depos its as a 
percentage o f total li abil ities. Since loans are in general ri ski er 
th an securities banks with ri skier assets and a less divers ified 
loan portfo lio rely less on insured funds. 
T he oth er va ri abl es such as th e ra ti o o f total securit y 
investm ent to total assets (SEC INV AR) , the rati o of net income 
to total assets (N IAR), the rati o o fn onperformin g assets to total 
assets (NPATA), and return on eq uit y (ROE) are stati sti ca ll y 
insigni ll ca tlt . 
For th e model using RO KER ED as th e dependen t va ri ab le 
result s arc w esented in co lumn (3) . Loa n- loss al lowance to 
tow \ loa ns t·at io (LLATL) is nega ti ve and stati sti ca ll y 
signifi cant at I%. Banks w ith a larger cushion to absorb 
poss ible losses on th e asset side have a smal ler proporti on of 
bt·okered depos it s. 
The pmxy for bank size (LN SIZE) is positi ve and 
stati st ica ll y signifi ca nt at \%. Larger banks have relatively 
more brokered deposits. T he ra ti onale behind thi s result may be 
that large banks ho ld a greater number o f depos its ove r 
$ \00 ,000 compared to small banks. Therefore large deposito rs 
exp lo it th e nomina l coverage limit and increase the ri sk 
exposure of th e insurance fund to poss ible losses. 
T he rati o of total securit y investment to to ta l assets 
(SECINVAR) is negative and stati sti ca ll y signifi cant at 5%. A 
higher rati o of total securit y to total assets is assoc iated w ith a 
sma ller amount o f brokered deposits and less abuse o f th e 
deposit insurance system . T hi s result is consistent with the 
results obtained in th e models using INSURED and EQU ITY 
as a dependent variab le. Banks with bett er asset qual ity are less 
l ikely to become inso lvent and in case o f inso lvency th e 
proport ion or ban\.- li ab il iti es th e depos it insurance system 
could be li ab le fm is smaller. Th us th ere is less r isk ex posure of 
.nsurance fund to poss ibl e losses. 
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T he l iquid ;-t SSets to total asse ts rat io (LAAR) coe ffi c ient is 
also tH:gat ivc and stati sti ca l! ) signific;-tnt at 5%. A hi gher rat io 
or l iqui d as~e t ~ to tota l asse ts im p li es a sma ller amount of 
brokered depos its I hi s result illustrates that ba nks with better 
a<;set qua l it) don ' t re ly on bmkered depos its as heav il y. Thus 
th ey 1·cprcsc nt lc ~s ri sl-- e:-.posure to the insurance fund . 
The rati o o r eo mm erc ial and indu stri al loa ns to total loans 
(C ILLR) is pos itiH~ and stati sti ca ll y significnnt at 1%. Bank s 
w ith a large amount o f co mmerc ial ami industri al loans rely 
more on broket·ed deposit s. Banks with less di ve rsifi ed loan 
portfo l ios Me more likely to become inso lvent and in case oi' 
inso l vency represe nt more ri sk ex posure to the insurance fu nd 
due to large depositors ex p lo it ing th e nominal cove rage li mit. 
T he rati o o f non-perfo rming :1 ssets to total assets is positi ve 
and stati sti call y signifi ca nt at 5°o. Nonperformin g assets add to 
overall ri sk. so th e more nonper forming asset a bank ho lds, th e 
more brokered deposits on their ba lance sheet . Hence in case of 
inso l vency, banks wi th a h igh rati o o f nonperformin g assets to 
total assets present more ri sk ex posure to the insurance fu nd 
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due to abuse of th e nominal cove rage l imit. 
T he deri va ti ves positi on indica tor (DE RCON), th e rat io of 
net income to total assets (N IAR) , and th e r·etum on equit y 
(R O E) are all stati st ica ll y insignifi cant 
Conclusion 
T his paper attempts to analy ze th e im pact o f the amoun t of 
real deposit insurance cove rage on the amount of ri sk at an 
indiv idual bank . Thi s is an import ant ques ti on for both 
academ ic researchers and practi t ioners since an increase in th e 
nominal amount of coverage is being considered th at would 
also res ult in an immedi ate ri se in rea l coverage. I f the ri se in 
rea l coverage increases moral hazard among banks, th en the 
po l icy change co uld expose th e FD IC and taxpa yers to a 
greater r isk o f loss and threaten the overa ll stabili ty of th e 
financial system . Contrary to these conj ectures , th e empirica l 
model in th is paper fi nds no support for th e moral hazard 
argument. The stead y decline in rea l deposit insura nce 
cove rage d id not have a significant impac t on bank ri sk as 
measured by the rat io of equ i ty to assets, th e amou nt of in sured 
deposits, or th e amount of brokered deposits. To the ex tent that 
these va r iab les measure bank r isk, it appe<n s th at ra ising rea l 
coverage w i ll have a minim al impact on risk taki ng behavior. 
T his would see m to support th e nrgument th at co ve r <~ ge should 
be rai sed to help depos it or·s <1 nd ir1 Stit ut io r1 s th at rely rn ort: 
heavi ly on insured deposi t'> for l"und in g C learl y thi , ha' 
imp li cati ons fo r· regul ators and pra ctrtr u r1 crs. l"hc co st 
associated wit h increased n1 or·nl hazar·d shoul d be: r·c lall vely 
smalL so i f th e benefi ts o f incr-eased C\J ve ragc arc nontm ial, 
then at th e marg in th e increased cove r·agc shoul d be beneli c inl 
to th e ba nking system nnd deposi tor·s alil-.e. T his result should 
inform th e debate on th e level of reil l deposit insurance 
cove rnge. 
A ny future resea r·ch on the level o f real covernge needs to 
address one mnj or l imitati on o f thi s stud y . A longer ti me seri es 
con tainin g at least one change in nomin:d coverage wou ld 
provide a much richer evaluati on o f the mom l hazard 
hypothesis. I f a change in nom inal coverage is enacted, th en an 
ex tension o f the current data set to inc lude numbers for at least 
a few periods aft er the change woul d allow fo r a more th orough 
ana lysis of the ques ti on addr·esse d above. Other ex tensions or 
thi s l ine of research might emp loy a more comr lex model of 
bank ri sk all ow ing interact ion bet ween the three mode Is 
estimated. Such a system approach to es timation would pr·ov ide 
a more comprehensive anal ysis of th e hypothesis in questi on. 
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Appe ndix A: Co rre lalio n Malr ix 
I QU ri Y INSU RED 13RO KERED RCOV LLATL LNSIZ E DERCON SECIN VAR N IAR LA AR C ILLR NPATA ROE 
EQU I rY I 
INSU RED 0 15 I 
BH O K EH EO -.006 . 185 I 
HCO\ ' 008 - 00 1 0.0 13 I 
LLATL 238 .005 .03 1 -.023 I 
LNS IZE - 169 .097 . 150 . 184 -.065 I 
DEHCON -0 12 62 1 . 16 1 .Oil .004 . 109 I 
SECINV A R 036 0 16 -003 .0 10 .033 -.059 .0 10 I 
N IA R 034 02 1 -.002 .003 022 - 043 - 008 .695 I 
LAA H 120 0 12 - 003 .029 .050 - 086 .0 17 .0 17 .009 I 
CILLH .038 0 11 .0 15 -.022 .096 079 .000 -.002 .000 .04 1 I 
N I'ATA -.006 - .003 .005 -.008 . 188 -.076 -.00 1 -.006 -.000 -.00 1 .038 I 
ROE - 204 .006 .04 0 -.005 -.094 226 . 00~ -.020 -.0 15 -.040 .04 1 .20 1 I 
Appe ndix B: 95 'Yo C o nfid ence Interva ls o f Regressio n Coefficien ts 
lmlqw ml cnl \ 'ar iabk s f) cpcndcnl Va riables 
EQllli iTY ( I) I NSl/ I{ Eil (2) BROh:EREO (3) 95 % Conlidcncc Intervals 
!?CO l ' -2 .96E+ I 0 -7 .94E.J 10 -4 77E+ IO lower 
374E+ IO 7 78E+ I O 4 28E+ IO upper 
u .. n L 2 05 E-0 1 I.I OE-0 1 - I 60E-OI lower 2 . ~ 9 E-O I 2 IOE-0 I - I 02E-01 upper 
LVSILE -J 96 E-02 -2 2 71--02 4 29E-02 lower 
-3 6-11:-()2 -1 531' -02 -1 71 E-02 upper 
/)/)!('(),\' -) 2(>1' -13 2 77 1 - 12 - I 0-IE- , _ lower 
I 791 - 12 77 11 - 12 I X I E- 12 upper 
.\/.('/,\' / ' //? I 22 L-115 - I 5 ~ I -0 I - I 12 1c-04 lower 
X .JXI:-05 I (>J l: -05 - I J'JE-05 upper 
N l. lli 2. 11 L-OJ - I IOE-03 -5 94E-04 lower 
J JJ F-OJ I 77E-03 1.06E-OJ upper 
UA/1 7.55 E-OJ 7. 14E-04 -3.86 [ -0J lower 
1.06E-02 7 9J E-03 2.98 1::-04 upper 
CIU!? - 1.4XE-02 
-5 72[-02 9.55 [-03 lower 
-5 2.j E-OJ -J .48E-02 2.24E-02 upper 
NI'AI:-t - I 49E-0 1 -J .75 E-02 J.54E-OJ lower 
- I 091:-0 1 5.26 1:-02 5 65E-02 upper 
110£ -3 OOE-02 
-2.66[-03 -6.R6E-OJ lower 
-2 40E-02 1. 16E-02 I J 8E-03 upper 
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